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package of amendments protecting the borrower-purchaser. 69 The main
thrust of this package is contained in the new CPLRC 503(f) which
specifies that venue in an action arising out of a "consumer credit
transaction" 70 must be laid in the county wherein the defendant re-
sides, if he is a New York resident, or where the transaction took place,
if within New York.71 CPLR 305(a) was changed 72 to provide that the
summons in such an action must prominently display at its head (1)
that it is based on a consumer credit transaction, (2) the county of
residence of any New York resident defendant, and (3) the county, if
within the state, where the transaction took place. These requirements
are designed to aid in implementing the new CPLR 51373 which
directs court clerks to reject a summons in a consumer credit transac-
tion where it appears on its face that it is sought to be filed in an im-
proper county. After a rejection, service is complete ten days after the
plaintiff files in the proper county. This new filing must include proof
of service of the original summons and proof of service by certified
mail of a notice specifying (1) the proper county, (2) the date the sum-
mons was filed in the proper county, (3) the date by which the defend-
ant must answer or appear, and (4) where the defendant must file his
answer or notice of appearance.
These provisions eliminate the hardship to which a defendant with
limited funds was formerly exposed when forced to travel to a remote
county either to defend an action or simply to transfer it when the
plaintiff had specified an improper county.74
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
CPLR 3101(a): Court denies discovery of police records to avoid in-
terference with an ongoing criminal investigation.
With certain qualifications, 75 a party bringing action against the
state is entitled to disclosure of all evidence "material and necessary" 76
69 L. 1973, ch. 238, at 317, eft. Sept. 1, 1973.
70 This is defined by the new CPLR 105(f), also added by L. 1973, ch. 238, as any
transaction whereby credit is extended to an individual, and the subject of the transaction
is to be used primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
71 If no defendant resides within the state and the transaction did not occur there,
normal venue provisions apply. CCA 301(a) has been changed similarly by L. 1973, ch. 238
for transactions taking place in, or involving residents of, New York City.
72 L. 1973, ch. 238, at 317, eff. Sept. 1, 1973.
73 Id. at 318.
74 See McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 170 N.Y.L.J. 9, July 13, 1973, at 1,
col. 1.
75 CPLR 3102(f provides that the state may not be compelled to answer interroga-
tories or to make admissions. Whereas disclosure against a private litigant is obtainable
on notice, a court order is necessary to compel disclosure by the state.
76 CPLR 3101(a) requires "full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action .... "
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"as if the state were a private person."77 When the evidence sought is
also the subject of a criminal investigation, however, there is a basic
conflict of policy considerations. Although the courts have adopted a
liberal policy regarding inspection of governmental records, 78 they
have held state information to be privileged and therefore unobtainable
when disclosure would betray a confidence or harm the public interest.79
In Nunziata v. Police Department of the City of New York,80 the
widow of a New York City Police Detective, whom the Department
claimed shot himself in an apparent suicide, sought to establish that
the death was actually a homicide, thus entitling her to line-of-duty
pension benefits. The Supreme Court, New York County, granted her
motion for discovery and inspection of the bullet and firearm which
killed the detective together with the clothes worn at the time of his
death. Discovery was temporarily denied as to a signature card from
the Police Property Clerk's office and all memoranda and reports pre-
pared by the police concerning the manner of his death. The court
considered that disclosure of these items might hamper an impending
investigation by Deputy Attorney General Maurice Nadjari and the
police into narcotics stolen from the Property Clerk's office.8 ' The
denial of the motion was without prejudice to a renewal after comple-
tion of the investigation. While acknowledging the continuing trend
favoring inspection of state records,82 the court reasoned that the Police
77 CPLR 3102(f). This section was amended in 1967 to allow disclosure against the
state in all courts, thus at least partially implementing the original intent of the Advisory
Committee on Practice and Procedure to treat the state as any other litigant. See THnu
REP. 390; 3A WK&M 3102.30. Disclosure against the state has since been generally
allowed. See, e.g., Lakeland Water Dist. v. Onondaga County Water Authority, 24 N.Y.2d
400, 248 N.E.2d 855, 301 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1969); State v. DeGroot, 35 App. Div. 2d 240, 315
N.Y.S.2d 310 (3d Dep't 1970); Head v. State, 32 App. Div. 2d 999, 301 N.Y.S.2d 657 (3d
Dep't 1969) (mem.); Diamond v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 854, 324
N.Y.S.2d 658 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1971).
78 See Egan v. Board of Water Supply, 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912); Kruger v.
County of Nassau, 53 Misc. 2d 166, 278 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967) (police
records); Scott v. County of Nassau, 23 Misc. 2d 648, 252 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1964) (police records).
79 CPLR 3101(b) provides that privileged matter shall not be obtainable in disclosure
proceedings. See Wilson v. State, 36 App. Div. 2d 559, 317 N.Y.S.2d 546 (3d Dep't 1971)
(mem.) (stating that the state has a common law privilege to withhold information where
disclosure would be against the public interest); Goergen v. State, 6 App. Div. 2d 974, 176
N.Y.S.2d 582 (3d Dep't 1958) (mem.) (acknowledging state's right to withhold names of
sources of confidential information); Langert v. Tenney, 5 App. Div. 2d 586, 173 N.Y.S.2d
665 (Ist Dep't 1958), appeal dismissed, 5 N.Y.2d 875, 155 N.E.2d 870, 182 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1959)
(Commissioner of Investigation for the City of New York held to have privilege justifying
refusal to disclose the name of an informant and the content of his communication in a
civil defamation action).
80 73 Misc. 2d 29, 341 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
81 The genuineness of the detectives signature on several of the receipts was in ques-
tion. Id. at 32, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
82 73 Misc. 2d at 31, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 25, citing Egan v. Board of Water Supply, 205
1973]
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Department's interest in secrecy outweighed the benefits of prompt
and full disclosure.
Privileges which allow the state to avoid disclosure ought to be
narrowly construed so as to prevent unnecessary prejudice to the pri-
vate litigant.8 3 In Nunziata, the court made no specific finding that the
information was either privileged matter under CPLR 3101(b) or mate-
rial prepared for litigation under CPLR 3101(d).84 Discovery was
denied without inquiry into how the release of the information which
led the police to conclude that the detective's death was suicide would
hamper the investigation of the stolen narcotics. Wile there is little
doubt that upon inquiry a connection could reasonably be drawn,
caution must be exercised where one of the investigating bodies is a
party to the action in which disclosure is sought.8 5 In such cases, the
mere recital that the matter is the subject of a confidential investiga-
tion should not be sufficient to defeat discovery.88
CPLR 3117(a)(3)(v): Provisions of the CPLR used to approximate
proceeding under the Uniform Support of Dependents Law.
A party entitled to support from an ex-spouse is subject to serious
hardship if recovery of periodic support payments cannot be accom-
plished without travel to a distant jurisdiction. To remedy this prob-
lem, the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands have enacted uniform support acts87 substantially sim-
ilar to New York's Uniform Support of Dependents Law.88 These laws
permit a verified petition to be filed in a court in the jurisdiction
wherein the petitioner seeking support resides.8 9 The petition is then
N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912); Kruger v. County of Nassau, 53 Misc. 2d 166, 278 N.Y.S.2d
28 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967).
83 See SA WK&M 3101.41.
84 CPLR 3101(d) provides that "material prepared for litigation" is qualifiedly priv-
ileged. See Jansen v. State of New York, 53 Misc. 2d 1005, 280 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(permitting discovery of photographs and reports made by the Bureau of Criminal Investi-
gation Division of the Department of State Police where these materials did not qualify
as material prepared for litigation and no contention was made that disclosure would
hamper any prosecution).
86 Where the government itself is a party, reliance on the [governmental privilege
to withhold confidential information) may require a finding against the govern-
ment on a disputed issue or fact which might have been disproved had the evi-
dence been available.
3A WK&M 5101.41, citing People v. Ramistella, 306 N.Y. 379, 118 N.E.2d 566 (1954);
United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719, 721 (W.D. La. 1949),
aff'd mer., 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
S See Scott v. County of Nassau, 43 Misc. 2d 648, 252 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1964).
87 See 12 J. ZLar, M. EDomONDS, M. BurrrY & M. KAUFMAN, NEW YoRK CIvIn PRACTICE
at 12-3 (Matthew Bender 1972).
88 DRL art. 3-A.
89 See DRL 37(1).
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